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Human Geography · AP Human Geography
where people live, how they grow and why they move
In 2023 about 8.09 billion people lived on earth (UN). They are spread very unevenly: a third of them live in just two countries, India and China, while huge areas of desert, ice and forest hold almost no one. And about 304 million of them, 3.7% of humanity, live in a country other than the one they were born in (UN DESA, 2024).
The unit asks three questions. Where do people live, and why? Physical and human factors explain the pattern, and different measures of density reveal different pressures. How do populations change? Births, deaths and migration change a population’s size and its structure by age and sex; models like the demographic transition describe the long-run pattern, and governments try to steer it. Why do people move, and with what effects? Push and pull factors, forced and voluntary migration, and the remittances, labor and ideas that migration sends back and forth.
The figure is the world as relief: each country’s tiles are raised by its population density (on a logarithmic scale), blue; India and China are red. Migrants walk the red arc from Mexico to the United States, the largest migration corridor in the world: nearly 11 million people born in Mexico live in the US (IOM).
| topic | |
|---|---|
| 2.1 | Population distribution |
| 2.2 | Consequences of population distribution |
| 2.3 | Population composition |
| 2.4 | Population dynamics |
| 2.5 | The demographic transition model |
| 2.6 | Malthusian theory |
| 2.7 | Population policies |
| 2.8 | Women and demographic change |
| 2.9 | Aging populations |
| 2.10 | Causes of migration |
| 2.11 | Forced and voluntary migration |
| 2.12 | Effects of migration |
Unit 2 is about 12–17% of the AP exam.
where people live, and three ways to measure crowding
People cluster where land, water and climate can feed them, and where history, jobs and governments have drawn them. The same country can look empty or crowded depending on which density you measure.
Physical factors. Climate (too cold, too dry or too wet), landforms (high mountains, steep slopes) and water decide where farming has been possible for thousands of years. Most people live on low, fertile plains and river valleys in the middle latitudes and near coasts: eastern China, the Ganges plain, Java, Europe, the Nile. Deserts, polar regions, high mountains and dense tropical forest are sparsely settled.
Human factors. Economic (jobs, ports, industry), political (capitals, borders, government resettlement) and historical (old farming cores, colonial port cities) forces concentrate people further. Today more than half the world lives in cities.
Three densities. Arithmetic density is people per unit of total land area: Bangladesh has 1,317 people per km², Canada 4 (2023, UN). It is easy to compute but hides where people actually are. Physiological density is people per unit of arable land: a high number means great pressure on the land that can grow food. Agricultural density is farmers per unit of arable land: a high number usually means small farms and little machinery, and so suggests a less developed economy; rich countries have few farmers on a lot of land.
| Egypt, 2023 | per km² | of |
|---|---|---|
| arithmetic density | 115 | all land |
| agricultural density | 190 | arable land |
| physiological density | 3,691 | arable land |
(UN WPP; FAO; ILO. Egypt’s land is about 995,000 km², of which 3.1% is arable; about 5.9 million people work in farming.)
Egypt’s arithmetic density looks modest. But nearly all of its 114.5 million people live on the ribbon of the Nile valley and delta, about 95% of them by the usual estimate, so its physiological density is 32 times its arithmetic density. Where physiological density is high, a country may import food or farm the same fields more intensively.
The figure: Egypt’s tiles, with the valley and delta red and its people standing on them; the three densities as bars on one scale: arithmetic (paper), agricultural (blue) and physiological (red).
carrying capacity and the strain on services
Where people are, and how many, shapes political, economic and social life. A place can hold only so many people at a given level of technology and wealth before its land, water and services are strained.
Carrying capacity is the number of people an area can support without degrading it. It is not fixed: irrigation, fertilizer, trade and new infrastructure raise it, and soil erosion, drought and falling aquifers lower it. When a population exceeds the carrying capacity, the result is overpopulation relative to the resources, not simply a large number: the Sahel’s herders can exceed it at a few people per km², while the Netherlands, with hundreds per km², does not, because it trades for what it needs.
Political. Dense regions win more seats in legislatures elected by population; sparse borderlands are hard to govern and defend, and some states move people into them (Indonesia’s transmigration program moved millions from crowded Java to the outer islands). Economic. Dense places supply workers and markets; sparse ones struggle to attract investment. Social. Fast-growing cities such as Lagos and Dhaka struggle to build housing, schools, clinics, transit and water fast enough, and informal settlements fill the gap. In emptying places, the opposite: Japanese villages with few children close their schools, and clinics and shops follow.
The figure is a model city (hypothetical), growing 3% a year from 100 thousand people. Its services each have a fixed capacity (blue); demand passes them one by one:
| service | room for | full after |
|---|---|---|
| clinics | 180 thousand | 19.6 years |
| schools | 220 thousand | 26.3 years |
| housing | 250 thousand | 30.5 years |
| water | 290 thousand | 35.5 years |
At 3% a year a city doubles in about 23 years, so a service built for today is full within a generation unless it grows too. The red in each gauge is the demand that capacity cannot meet: crowded classrooms, waiting lists, water rationing.
pyramids, sex ratios and dependency
A population pyramid shows a population’s age and sex structure: one bar per five-year age band, males to the left and females to the right. Its shape records past births, deaths and migration, and predicts the future.
Expansive pyramids, wide at the base, belong to fast-growing populations with high birth rates: in Niger 47% of people are under 15. Stationary (or near-stationary) pyramids have roughly equal bands up to old age: the United States. Constrictive pyramids are narrower at the base than in the middle, the mark of a population with few births that will shrink without immigration: Japan.
Cohorts show as bulges. The US baby boom (born 1946–1964) is the wide band aged about 60–77 in 2023, and their children make a second bulge in their 30s. Japan’s two bulges are its own post-war boom (in their 70s) and the boomers’ children (around 50). Wars, famines and policies leave notches.
Sex ratio is the number of males per 100 females. About 105 boys are born for every 100 girls, but women live longer, so older bands lean female (Japan has 4,509 thousand women aged 85+ and 2,186 thousand men). Sex-selective abortion skews ratios at birth (China, India), and male labor migration skews them in destinations (see 2.12).
The dependency ratio compares the people usually too young or too old to work (0–14 and 65+) with those of working age (15–64), per 100: (young + old) ÷ working age × 100.
| 2023 | under 15 | youth dependency | old-age dependency | total | sex ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Niger | 47% | 93 | 5 | 98 | 103 |
| United States | 18% | 27 | 27 | 54 | 101 |
| Japan | 12% | 20 | 50 | 70 | 95 |
(UN WPP 2024.) Niger’s dependents are almost all children; Japan’s are mostly old; both have a high ratio. A young population has population momentum: even if fertility falls to replacement tomorrow, its large young cohorts will keep the number of births high for decades as they reach parenthood.
The figure: each country’s bars are shares of its own population, red under 15 and blue 65 and over; the cursor climbs one band at a time.
birth rates, death rates, growth and doubling
A population changes by births, deaths and migration. Demographers measure each as a rate, so countries of different sizes can be compared.
The crude birth rate (CBR) is births per 1,000 people a year; the crude death rate (CDR) is deaths per 1,000 a year. Their difference, divided by 10, is the rate of natural increase (RNI), in percent: natural because it leaves out migration. RNI = (CBR − CDR) ÷ 10. At a steady RNI a population doubles in about 70 ÷ RNI years (the rule of 70).
The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children a woman would have over her life at current rates; about 2.1 is replacement level where few children die. The infant mortality rate (IMR) is deaths of infants under one year per 1,000 live births, a sensitive measure of health care, nutrition and sanitation. A low CDR can hide high infant mortality in a young population, and a high CDR in an old, healthy one (Japan’s exceeds Niger’s).
| 2023 | CBR | CDR | RNI | doubles in | TFR | IMR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Niger | 41.9 | 8.9 | 3.30% | 21 years | 6.06 | 66.9 |
| Nigeria | 33.0 | 11.7 | 2.12% | 33 years | 4.48 | 70.1 |
| India | 16.1 | 6.6 | 0.95% | 74 years | 1.98 | 24.5 |
| United States | 10.6 | 8.7 | 0.20% | 350 years | 1.62 | 5.5 |
| Japan | 6.0 | 12.3 | -0.62% | does not double | 1.21 | 1.8 |
| world | 16.3 | 7.6 | 0.87% | 80 years | 2.25 | 28.4 |
(UN WPP 2024; infant mortality UN IGME. RNI from the unrounded rates.) Life expectancy at birth, the average years a newborn would live at current death rates, rounds out the picture.
The map shows the pattern: natural increase is highest in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South and West Asia; most of Europe, Japan, South Korea and now China have natural decrease, more deaths than births. A country can still grow with natural decrease if immigrants arrive; the US and Canada grow largely through immigration.
The figure: red natural increase and blue natural decrease, each country’s tiles raised by its rate; five countries rise in turn.
deaths fall first, births follow
The demographic transition model (DTM) describes how a country’s birth and death rates, and so its growth, change as it industrializes and urbanizes. It was drawn from the history of Europe and North America.
| stage | birth rate | death rate | growth | why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 · high stationary | high | high, fluctuating | slow | famine, disease; no country today |
| 2 · early expanding | high | falls fast | rapid | food supply, clean water, sanitation, vaccines |
| 3 · late expanding | falls | low | slowing | cities, schooling, women working, contraception; children cost more than they earn |
| 4 · low stationary | low | low | near zero | small families by choice |
| 5 · declining | very low | rising | negative | an aging population: deaths exceed births |
Real countries, by their 2023 rates: Niger (CBR 41.9, CDR 8.9); India (CBR 16.1, CDR 6.6); United States (CBR 10.6, CDR 8.7); Japan (CBR 6.0, CDR 12.3). Niger is late in stage 2 or early in stage 3, India in stage 3, the US in stage 4, Japan in stage 5.
Limits of the model. It assumes every country will follow Europe’s path, driven by industrialization, but many countries’ death rates fell in a few decades through imported medicine rather than economic growth, and some stalled in stage 2 or 3. It ignores migration. Government policy can speed it (China), and culture and religion can slow it. Stage 5 was added later and is still debated. It predicts no endpoint and says nothing about how long a stage lasts.
The epidemiological transition (Abdel Omran, 1971) is its partner: the causes of death change through the stages. Stage 1, pestilence and famine (the Black Death); stage 2, receding pandemics (cholera falls with clean water); stage 3, degenerative and human-caused diseases (heart disease, cancer); stage 4, delayed degenerative diseases (medicine pushes them to older ages); and a possible stage 5, the reemergence of infectious and parasitic diseases (antibiotic resistance, HIV/AIDS, COVID-19).
The figure is a model country (hypothetical curves): the ink birth rate and dark death rate, the red natural increase between them, and the blue population growing through stages 2 and 3, leveling in 4 and falling in 5. The four real countries stand in their stages, birth rate over death rate.
will people outrun their food?
In 1798 the English economist Thomas Malthus argued in An Essay on the Principle of Population that population, unchecked, grows geometrically while food grows only arithmetically, so people will always press against their food supply.
Population could double every 25 years: 1, 2, 4, 8, 16. Food, at best, adds the same amount each period: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. After 6 periods, 64 times the people would share 7 times the food. Population would be held down by positive checks that raise deaths (famine, disease, war) or preventive checks that lower births (Malthus’s “moral restraint”: later marriage and abstinence).
Neo-Malthusians revived the argument in the twentieth century, adding the depletion of resources and the environment: Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) predicted mass famine in the 1970s, and the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth (1972) modeled collapse from resource use.
Critics. The Danish economist Ester Boserup (1965) argued the reverse: population pressure drives farmers to intensify, with new tools, irrigation and more harvests a year, so growth can raise food output. Julian Simon called human ingenuity “the ultimate resource.” Marxist critics argued that hunger is caused by poverty and unequal distribution, not by the number of people. And Malthus could not foresee the agricultural revolutions, trade and contraception that broke his ratio.
| world | 1961 | 2023 | index (1961 = 100) |
|---|---|---|---|
| population (billion) | 3.06 | 8.09 | 264 |
| cereal production (million t) | 877 | 3,126 | 356 |
| cereal per person (kg) | 286134 | 386307 | 135 |
(UN WPP; FAO.) Since 1961 food has outgrown people, thanks above all to the Green Revolution’s seeds, fertilizer and irrigation. Hunger persists, but mostly where poverty, conflict and poor distribution keep food from people, which supports the critics. Neo-Malthusians answer that the gains depend on fossil fuels, falling aquifers and soils that may not last.
The figure: on the left, Malthus’s model, red people and blue food, the shaded gap the people his checks would remove; on the right, what happened.
governments try to steer births and arrivals
Governments try to change how many children their citizens have, and who may come into the country. The results are often smaller, slower or different from what was planned.
Antinatalist policies try to lower the birth rate: family-planning programs, access to contraception, education campaigns, and at the extreme, coercion. Pronatalist policies try to raise it: cash for each child, paid parental leave, child care, tax breaks, housing, and sometimes restrictions on contraception and abortion. Immigration policies decide who may enter and stay: quotas by origin, points for skills, family reunification, guest-worker programs and refugee resettlement.
| year | policy | |
|---|---|---|
| France | 1939 | pronatalist: the Family Code: allowances that grow with each child |
| India | 1952 | antinatalist: the first national family-planning program; forced sterilizations in the Emergency, 1975–77 |
| United States | 1965 | immigration: the Immigration and Nationality Act ends the national-origins quotas of 1924 |
| Romania | 1966 | pronatalist: Decree 770 bans most abortions |
| Canada | 1967 | immigration: the points system: immigrants chosen for skills, not origin |
| Singapore | 1972 | antinatalist: “Stop at Two”; reversed in 1987: “Have three, or more if you can afford it” |
| Australia | 1973 | immigration: the end of the White Australia policy |
| China | 1980 | antinatalist: the one-child policy, to 2015 |
| Iran | 1989 | antinatalist: a national family-planning program; reversed toward more births from 2012 |
| South Korea | 2006 | pronatalist: the first five-year plan for low fertility and an aging society |
| Russia | 2007 | pronatalist: “maternity capital”: a payment for a second child |
| Hungary | 2019 | pronatalist: mothers of four or more children pay no income tax for life |
China’s one-child policy (1980–2015) limited most urban couples to one child, enforced with fines, pressure and forced abortions and sterilizations; rural families were often allowed a second child if the first was a girl. But China’s fertility had already fallen from 6.08 children per woman in 1970 to 2.74 in 1980, under the earlier “later, longer, fewer” campaign. Its consequences include a sex ratio skewed toward boys (from sex-selective abortion), a fast-aging population and the “4-2-1” family (four grandparents, two parents, one child). The limit rose to two children in 2016 and three in 2021; fertility kept falling, to 1.00 in 2023 (UN WPP).
Pronatalist policies have mostly raised fertility only a little: South Korea has spent heavily since 2006, and its TFR was 0.72 in 2023, the lowest in the world. Romania’s ban on abortion in 1966 doubled births for a year, then many women turned to illegal abortions and maternal deaths rose. France’s long-standing family policies are credited with keeping its fertility among Europe’s highest.
The figure: the map’s pins rise in their years, red antinatalist, blue pronatalist, dark immigration laws; China is raised during the one-child years; behind it, China’s total fertility rate, 1950–2023.
schooling, work and smaller families
As women gain access to education, paid work and health care, and as their legal and social status rises, they tend to marry later and have fewer children. Changing roles for women are one of the strongest forces behind falling fertility.
Education. Girls who stay in school marry and have children later, know more about contraception and child health, and can earn more, which raises the cost of time spent away from work. Work. Paid employment outside the home gives women income and a reason to delay and limit births. Health and contraception. Lower infant mortality means parents need fewer births to raise the children they want; access to family planning lets women choose. Rights. Laws on the age of marriage, property and inheritance change women’s choices too.
Across 141 countries, the more years of school women aged 25 and over have had, the fewer children women have: the correlation is r = -0.80 (UNDP; UN WPP, 2023).
| 1990 | 2023 | |
|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh: women’s schooling (years) | 2.2 | 6.2 |
| Bangladesh: children per woman | 4.51 | 2.16 |
| Iran: women’s schooling (years) | 4.6 | 10.9 |
| Iran: children per woman | 4.93 | 1.7 |
Bangladesh, still mostly rural and poor in 1990, cut its fertility by half through girls’ schooling (including stipends for girls in secondary school), community health workers who brought contraception to villages, and women’s jobs in the garment industry. Iran pushed women’s education and a national family-planning program, and its fertility fell faster than almost any country’s. In India, the state of Kerala, long far ahead of the rest of the country in women’s literacy, reached replacement-level fertility decades before India as a whole.
A correlation is not proof of cause: richer, more urban countries have both more schooling and fewer births, and lower child mortality helps both. But schooling women is one of the few policies tied to lower fertility everywhere, without coercion.
The figure: every country as a dark dot; red Bangladesh’s path and blue Iran’s, 1990–2023, moving down and to the right.
fewer workers for each older person
When birth rates stay low and people live longer, a population ages: the share of older people rises and the share of workers falls. Aging changes what a country spends on, who does its work, and how it pays for pensions.
| aged 65 and over | 1950 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Japan | 4.9% | 29.5% |
| Italy | 8.1% | 24.2% |
| United States | 8.0% | 17.4% |
| China | 5.0% | 14.3% |
| Nigeria | 3.0% | 3.0% |
(UN WPP 2024.) In Japan, in 1950 there were 12.2 people aged 15–64 for each person aged 65 and over; in 2023 there were 2.0. Nigeria, young and fast-growing, has barely changed.
Consequences. A rising old-age dependency ratio means fewer taxpayers for each pensioner, so governments raise taxes or the retirement age, or cut benefits. Health care and long-term care grow; schools close and labor shortages appear. Older populations may vote for different priorities. Rural areas, left by the young, age fastest: Japan has millions of empty homes (akiya), and some Italian villages sell houses for a symbolic euro to attract residents.
Responses. Immigration of working-age people (Canada and Germany admit many; Japan has slowly opened programs for foreign workers); pronatalist policies (2.7); keeping older people working longer; and automation, such as Japan’s robots in factories and in elder care. Because women live longer than men, the oldest ages are mostly female, and caring for them falls mostly on women.
The figure: the share aged 65 and over, red Japan, blue Italy, dark the United States, ink China and pale Nigeria; and Japan’s working-age people standing for each red older person, year by year.
push, pull, distance and what lies between
Migration is a permanent or long-term move to a new place. People move because of conditions that push them out of one place and pull them to another, weighed against the obstacles between.
Push and pull factors are economic (jobs, wages, land), social (education, family, discrimination), political (war, persecution, freedom), environmental (drought, floods, climate, a pleasant climate) and cultural (religion, language). The same factor can push from one place and pull to another: low wages push, high wages pull. Economic factors drive most voluntary migration.
Intervening obstacles are barriers between the origin and the destination: distance and its cost, mountains and seas, borders and immigration law, language. An intervening opportunity is a chance found on the way, such as a job in a city short of the destination, that stops the move there (Everett Lee, 1966; Samuel Stouffer, 1940). Distance decay: the farther a place, the fewer migrants reach it.
Ravenstein’s laws of migration (E. G. Ravenstein, 1885 and 1889), from British census data, still describe much of migration:
| 1 | most migrants move a short distance |
| 2 | long-distance migrants go to big cities |
| 3 | migration proceeds step by step |
| 4 | each stream of migration has a counterstream |
| 5 | most migrants are adults; families are less likely to cross borders |
| 6 | rural people are more likely to migrate than city people |
| 7 | women migrate more within their country, men more abroad |
| 8 | most migration is for economic reasons |
(Women migrating mostly within the country and men abroad was Ravenstein’s Britain; today women are about half of international migrants.)
Zelinsky’s mobility transition (Wilbur Zelinsky, 1971) ties the kind of migration to the stage of the demographic transition:
| stage 1 | little migration; seasonal moves |
| stage 2 | rural to urban, and emigration abroad |
| stage 3 | rural to urban slows; moves between cities grow |
| stage 4 | city to city and city to suburb; immigrants arrive |
| stage 5 | city to city and within cities; immigration of workers |
The figure is a model region (hypothetical): red push factors drive 24 migrants from the village; blue pull factors draw them to the city. 12 stop at the market town nearby, 7 at the regional city, an intervening opportunity, and only 5 cross the ridge, the intervening obstacle, to the big city: distance decay, and migration by steps.
refugees, IDPs, and the many kinds of moving by choice
Migration is forced when people are made to move by violence, persecution or disaster, and voluntary when they choose to move, usually for economic opportunity. Most real moves fall between: a choice made under pressure.
Forced migration. A refugee has crossed an international border because of a well-founded fear of persecution, war or violence (the 1951 Refugee Convention). An asylum seeker has asked for that protection and is waiting for a decision. An internally displaced person (IDP) has fled home but is still inside their own country, and so has no international legal status. The Atlantic slave trade, which carried about 12.5 million Africans to the Americas, was the largest forced migration in history. By 2024 more than 120 million people were forcibly displaced (UNHCR).
| end of 2024 | millions |
|---|---|
| refugees from | Syria 6 · Afghanistan 5.8 · Ukraine 5.1 · South Sudan 2.3 · Sudan 2.1 |
| refugees in | Iran 3.5 · Türkiye 2.9 · Germany 2.7 · Uganda 1.8 · Pakistan 1.6 |
| IDPs in | Sudan 11.6 · Syria 7.4 · Colombia 7 · DR Congo 6.9 · Yemen 4.8 |
(UNHCR. Refugees under UNHCR’s mandate; Venezuelans abroad are mostly counted separately, as others in need of protection.) Most refugees stay in a neighboring country, often a poor one: Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, Syrians in Türkiye, South Sudanese in Uganda, Sudanese in Chad.
Voluntary migration comes in many forms. Internal migration stays within a country, above all rural-to-urban migration (China’s hundreds of millions of rural migrants to its coastal cities) and interregional moves (the Great Migration of about six million African Americans from the rural South to Northern and Western cities, 1910–1970). International migration crosses borders. Chain migration follows relatives and neighbors who went before. Step migration moves in stages, village to town to city. Guest workers are invited for a set time (the US Bracero Program with Mexico, 1942–1964; West Germany’s agreement with Turkey, 1961). Transnational migrants live in two countries at once, sending money and keeping ties. Transhumance is the seasonal movement of herders with their animals between pastures.
The figure: red the countries refugees come from, blue those that host them, each raised by its count (countries with at least 300 thousand); the main routes between; and dark columns for the internally displaced.
remittances, brain drain and migrant labor
Migration changes both the places people leave and the places they go: their economies, their populations, their politics and their cultures.
Remittances are money migrants send home. They are one of the largest flows of money to developing countries, larger than foreign aid, and they pay for food, school fees, houses and small businesses. Some countries depend on them heavily:
| remittances received, % of GDP, 2024 | |
|---|---|
| Tajikistan | 47.2% |
| Nicaragua | 26.6% |
| Nepal | 26% |
| Honduras | 25.7% |
| El Salvador | 24.3% |
| Gambia | 22% |
(World Bank.) Most of Tajikistan’s migrants work in Russia; Nepal’s in the Gulf states, Malaysia and India; Central Americans’ in the United States. India receives the most remittances in dollars of any country.
Brain drain is the loss of educated and skilled people, such as doctors, nurses and engineers, to emigration, which costs the countries that paid for their training. Receiving countries gain (brain gain), and some migrants return with skills and capital.
Dependence on migrant labor. The Gulf states run on foreign workers: immigrants are 76.7% of Qatar’s people and 74% of the United Arab Emirates’ (UN DESA, 2024), most of them men from South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa working in construction and services under the kafala sponsorship system, which ties a worker to an employer. The UAE has 178 men for every 100 women (UN WPP, 2023): its pyramid bulges with men aged 20–49. Rich countries depend on migrants for farm work, care work and health care too.
Other effects. Origins can lose their young adults, leaving more children, elders and women behind; destinations gain workers and taxpayers, and often a younger population. Migrants form ethnic enclaves and neighborhoods, change cuisines, languages, religions and landscapes, and spread ideas both ways. Migration can bring tension too: nativism and anti-immigrant politics, competition for some jobs and housing, and debates over borders and citizenship.
The figure: red each country raised by remittances as a share of its GDP (where they are 5% or more), with money flowing home along five corridors; blue the Gulf states raised by their migrants’ share of the population; and the UAE’s pyramid, men blue.
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